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RECENT CASES

BILLS

AND

NOTES-CREDITING

PROCEEDS-CONDITIONAL

CREDIT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR VALUE-Plaintiff, a recipient of

a dishonored check, having received it from the endorser as
additional credit upon a pre-existing debt, brought action
against the maker claiming to be a "holder in due course," 1
thus immune to all personal defenses as between the maker
and the endorser 2 The Supreme Court of Iowa held, four
judges dissenting, that the recipient of the dishonored check
who extended additional credit in exchange for a note due,
had not given sufficient "value" s to qualify as a "holder in
due course for value" I Peterson v Modjeska, 125 N.W.2d
751 (Iowa 1964)
It is well settled under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act that an antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes
value5 and the transfer of a negotiable paper, in payment
of or as collateral security for a pre-existing debt is a transfer
for value.6 Generally recognizing the issuance of a check
to a holder for credit on an antecedent debt to be for value,
the majority of jurisdictions require the credit to be absolute.
When there is no passing of new consideration, change in the
holder's position, or diminishing of the debt, the crediting of
the antecedent debt has been held by the majority to be
8
merely provisional.
1.

IOWA CODE

ANN.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

§ 541.52 (1950)
§ 3-302.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-05-02 (1960)

CODE

2. IOWA CODE ANN. § 541.57 (1950) N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-05-07 (1960)
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305.
3. IOWA CODE ANN. § 541.25 (1950)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03-02 (1960),
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-303.
4. IOWA CODE ANN. § 541-26 (1950) N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03-03 (1960),
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 3.
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see

see

5. Sasner v. Ornsten, 93 Cal. App. 467, 209 P.2d 44 (1949)
Kelso & Co. v.
Bills, 224 N.Y. 528, 121 N.E. 364 (1918).
6. J. I. Porter Lumber Co. v. Bonner, 172 Ark. 828, 290 S.W 606 (1927)
State Bank of Halstad v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136 N.W.204 (1912)
Ahern V.
Towle, 310 Mass. 695, 39 N.E.2d 561 (1942). The same rule applies to nonnegotiable notes.
7. Atkinson v. Englewood State Bank, 141 Col. 425, 348 P.2d 702 (1960)
Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank v. Hub Fruit Co., 285 Mass. 187, 189 N.E. 89
(1934)
Bankers Trust Co. v. Nagler, 16 App. Div. 477, 229 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1962).
8. People's Fin. & Thrift Co. of Pomona Valley v. Matthews Fruit Co., 104
Cal. App. 630, 286 Pac. 710 (1930), Trevisol v. Fresno Fruit Growers' Co., 195
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The problem is that while a creditor does not alter his
position, but becomes a holder for value by taking a third
party's note as additional security for a pre-existing debt,
free from any defenses between prior parties, he may not
receive and apply a check in the same manner and maintain
the status of a holder for value.
It is not doubted that a check, when dishonored, becomes
a promissory note and the maker is liable. 9 There is no
presumption when a check is passed to a creditor in payment
of a debt due that it is accepted as complete or partial
extinguishment of the obligation; 10 only that it will become
absolute on the honoring of the instrument." The Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act does not specify under what circumstances an antecedent debt will constitute value,' 2 nor
3
does it make any provision for conditional credit.
The principle case has reached back fifty-six years to
re-vitalize a limited decision which does not appear to have
been previously followed in the Iowa courts.1 4 The Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act should be broad in scope, not
limited to circumstances where the instrument is tendered
for absolute credit.1 5 The dissenting judge's opinion that the
court should follow the "modern trend as to negotiable
instruments", 6 is supported in cases from various jurisdic7
tions.
The Uniform Commercial Code appears to recognize the
problem and give support to modern decisions by separating
consideration from value, and expressing value as collateral
Iowa 1377, 192 N.W 517 (1923)
Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Jaeger, 282
App. Div. 1067, 126 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1953).
9.
Patterson v. Oakes, 191 Iowa 78, 181 N.W 787 (1921).
10. Fair Loans v. Wilkinson, 211 Md. 216, 126 A.2d 851 (1956).
11. 6 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1875F (Rev. Ed.
1958).
12.
Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Citizens' State Bank, 132 Iowa 706, 109 N.W

198 (1908).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Atkinson v. Englewood State Bank, supra note 7.
Supra note 12.
Ahern v. Towle, supra note 6.
Peterson v. Modjeska, 125 N.W.2d 751, 757 (Iowa 1964).

17. Merced Sec. Say. Bank v. Bent Bros., 279 P 765 (Cal. 1929)
Ahern v.
Towle, supra note 6 Fair Loans v. Wilkinson, supra note 10 Citrin v. Tansey,
107 N.J.L. 368, 153 Atl. 523

(1931).
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security given for an antecedent debt requiring no concessions
from the holder 18
North Dakota, although having no case law on similar
factual situations, appears to follow the majority view that
conditional credit alone is insufficient for value. 19 "The law
should be progressive; it should advance with changing
conditions. It should also correct trends proceeding from
unsound results. '2 0 By accepting the view of the principle
case North Dakota courts would be providing justice to those
persons who deal with checks daily and apply them as payments and credits.
HARLAN K. HOLLY

NEGLIGENCE-CARE AS TO TRESPASSERS-LIABILITY OF LAND-

OWNER FOR MERE PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE-The two and one-half

year old plaintiff was severely injured in a fall from an
apartment window enclosed by a defective screen. When
injured he was living with the tenant contrary to the terms
of the tenant's lease with the defendants. This arrangement
was neither known to the defendants, nor in any way consented
to by them. The lease required the defendants to make all
repairs except those necessitated by damage caused by the
tenants. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir., held,
one judge dissenting, that although the plaintiff was a trespasser as a matter of law, and the defective screen was a
static condition, the plaintiff was well within the range of
foreseeability in terms of those persons to whom injury
might result from an unsafe screen. The terms of the lease
were not the outer limits of the defendants' vision. The
dissenting judge held that under the circumstances, the
defendants owed the plaintiff no duty with respect to the
screens since he was plainly a trespasser Gould v DeBeve,
330 F.2d 826 (D C. Cir 1964)
This case represents a trend toward increasing a land18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-408.
19. See Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
86 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1957).
20. Phillips v. Foster, 252 Iowa 1076, 109 N.W.2d 604 (1961).

